Journal of Accountancy
Volume 50

Issue 2

Article 2

8-1930

Margin Transactions and the Law
L. L. Briggs

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jofa
Part of the Accounting Commons

Recommended Citation
Briggs, L. L. (1930) "Margin Transactions and the Law," Journal of Accountancy: Vol. 50 : Iss. 2 , Article 2.
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jofa/vol50/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Accountancy by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more information,
please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

Margin Transactions and Law
By L. L. Briggs
The general upward trend of the stock market for the past few
years and the sudden debacle of last October have focused the at
tention of business men upon the stock exchange and its activities.
Among these activities, those carried on by the stockbroker are of
fundamental importance because he bridges the gap between
buyers and sellers of securities. In performing his duties, it is
necessary that he handle large amounts of money and stocks for
customers who deal on a margin basis. This places him in a posi
tion of considerable responsibility and makes his legal status a
subject worthy of consideration.
In our present economic system there is need of a method by
which one can purchase and sell stocks largely on credit. The
stockbroker undertakes to supply this need by dealing with
securities on margin for customers. In case of a “long” purchase
the customer places in the hands of the broker a certain percentage
of the purchase price, with the understanding that the broker will
furnish the remainder needed to make the purchase. Since the
latter is able to supply only a small part of this money, the major
part of it, usually about eighty per cent, is raised by pledging the
stock. Then he must carry the stock until the customer orders it
sold or delivered. If it is sold the broker deducts from the selling
price the amount of the advances and all charges and turns the
balance over to the customer. Should the customer decide to
take the stock, he may do so upon reimbursing the broker for the
advances and charges. If before sale or delivery the market price
declines, the broker may call for more margin, so that he will run
no risk of loss should the price fall more than the original margin.
If the customer fails to put up the additional margin demanded,
the broker may sell on the open market, deduct his advances and
charges from the proceeds and transfer the balance to the cus
tomer.
The “short” sale differs in some respects from the “long” pur
chase. In this type of margin transaction, the customer orders the
broker to sell stock which the customer does not own, and, of course,
can not deliver, and deposits a cash or a security margin. In order
that the delivery may be made, the broker, if he has it, may lend
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the customer the stock sold and keep the money received as secur
ity. Usually, however, the broker has none of the stock in his
possession, so he borrows it in order to make the delivery and pays
the market value thereof to the lending broker. Should the price
rise the broker may call for more margin and if it is not forth
coming he may purchase stock in the open market to cover the
loan, and, after deducting the charges, return the balance of the
margin to the customer.
The legal effect of the dealings between stockbroker and cus
tomer is based, in part, upon custom (Richardson v. Shaw (1908)
209 U. S. 365). According to Chief Justice Rugg in Hall v.
Paine (1916) 224 Mass. 262:
Doubtless, when one employs another to trade for him in a particular
market, he impliedly authorizes the dealings to be conducted according to
the established usages of that particular market, whether he knows them
or not. . . .

The same principle was later approved by the court in Matter of
Cates (1922) 283 Fed. 541. However, special agreements be
tween broker and customer take precedence over trade customs
and practices in the particular business involved.
First, let us consider the relation of the broker to the customer
in a margin transaction. Jones, in section 496 of his work on
Pledges, gives this summary:
The broker acts in a threefold relation: first, in purchasing the stock he is
an agent; then, in advancing money for the purchase, he becomes a credi
tor; and, finally, in holding the stock to secure the advances made, he be
comes a pledgee of it. It does not matter that the actual possession of the
stock was never in the customer. The form of a delivery of the stock to
the customer, and a re-delivery by him to the broker, would have consti
tuted a strict formal pledge. But this delivery and re-delivery would
leave the parties in precisely the same situation they are in when, waiving
this formality, the broker retains the certificate as security for the advance.

Dos Passos, on page 196 of his standard book on Stock Brokers,
says:
Upon the whole, while it must be conceded that there are apparently some
incongruous features in the relation, there seems to be neither difficulty nor
hardship in holding that a stockbroker is a pledgee; for, although it is true
that he may advance all or the greater part of the money embraced in the
speculation, if he acts honestly, faithfully, and prudently, the entire risk is
upon the client. ... To introduce a different rule would give opportuni
ties for sharp practices and frauds, which the law should not invite.

Chief Justice Hunt, in the leading case of Markham v. Jaudon
(1869) 41 N. Y. 235, said:
It can not be doubted . . . that shares of stock in an incorporated com
pany, however unsubstantial may be its character, or however fluctuating
their value, may form the subject of a pledge. . . .
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The above quotations may be considered fair statements of the
rule followed in New York where margin stock transactions are
most numerous and important. According to this doctrine, the
broker, although he usually requires the customer to sign away his
formal rights to the shares and takes them in his own name, is not
the owner of stock bought on margin for a customer, but is merely
a pledgee of that property and the relationship between the par
ties is that of pledgor and pledgee. The same situation prevails
where the customer deposits stock with the broker as margin for a
purchase. In McIntyre v. Whitney (1910) 139 N. Y. 557, the
court said:
I am unable to perceive how in principle there can be any distinction be
tween a pledge of shares of stock to a broker as security for advances made
by him with which to make the purchase and a pledge of stock or other
property to a bank for an ordinary loan.

The fact that the customer initiates the transaction, pays interest,
bears the burden of assessments, receives dividends and incurs
the liability for depreciation, seems clearly to show an intention,
not to create merely a contract right for future delivery, but to
vest in him the beneficial ownership of the stock, subject, of course,
to a security title in the broker. The New York rule has been
followed by the state from which it receives its name, by the
supreme court of the United States (Richardson v. Shaw (1908)
209 U. S. 365), and by the highest courts of California, Connecti
cut, Illinois, Maryland, Ohio and Pennsylvania.
Although it has been held in three decisions that the customer
remains the owner of securities deposited with a broker as margin,
thus making the latter a pledgee (Furber v. Dane (1909) 203 Mass.
108; In re Swift (1901) 108 Fed. 212; Hutchinson v. Le Roy (1902)
113 Fed. 202) it appears to be settled in Massachusetts that the
legal title to stock carried on margin or deposited as margin is in
the broker and not in the customer. According to Justice De
Courcy in Crehan v. Megargel (1920) 235 Mass. 279:
In accordance with the long established rule of law in the commonwealth,
the legal title to the stocks carried on margin was in the brokers, as be
tween them and their customer; and this is true alike of the stocks bought
on margin by the defendants, and those deposited with them. . . .

Consequently, the relationship between the parties is that of
debtor and creditor (Chase v. Boston (1902) 180 Mass. 458;
Furber v. Dane (1910) 204 Mass. 412). The broker is regarded
as the owner of the shares upon a conditional executory contract
to deliver them to the customer on demand and proper tender
101
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(Western v. Jordan (1897) 168 Mass. 401). The supreme court of
Massachusetts, speaking through Chief Justice Holmes, regarded
the “extreme tenuity of connection with any specific object” as an
insurmountable obstacle to the existence of a pledge (Chase v.
City of Boston (1902) 180 Mass. 458).
The fact that the Massachusetts doctrine does not give the
customer legal title to the stock bought for him on margin or
deposited by him as margin does not mean that he has no rights in
the shares. He has an equitable right in them that will be pro
tected by the courts. In Furber v. Dane (1909) 203 Mass. 108,
the court allowed a plaintiff in equity to recover stock deposited
on margin with a broker.
The Massachusetts rule has been adversely criticized. Dos
Passos, in Stock Brokers, states that if this construction were
adopted it would become very questionable whether all margin
transactions could not be set aside as mere wagers. It is only by a
perverted construction of the understanding of the parties that
the broker can be regarded as the owner of the stock because all
indicia point to the customer as the holder of the legal title.
The way in which a broker carries on his business prevents him
from keeping the margin stocks acquired for each customer apart
from other stocks of the same kind. By common practice, securi
ties deposited are merged with and treated in precisely the same
manner as securities purchased (Crehan v. Megargel (1920) 235
Mass. 279). According to the court in Richardson v. Shaw (1908)
209 U. S. 365:
. . . stock has no earmark which distinguishes one share from another
. . . like grain of a uniform quality, one bushel is of the same kind and
value as another.

While in the hands of the broker, at least, the courts regard shares
of stock as fungible. Consequently, there is no reason for separa
tion of shares and the law places the broker under no obligation in
this respect.
Moreover, the broker need not keep the identical certificates
purchased or deposited as his right to substitute certificates of a
like kind and of the same aggregate amount is unquestioned
(Duel v. Hollins (1916) 241 U. S. 523). This point was settled in
New York over a century ago when Chancellor Kent, in Nourse v.
Prime (1820) 4 Johns. Ch. 490, said:
The shares in question were not defined and designated, so as to be dis
tinguished from other bank shares in the same bank; and if defendants had
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always, in their possession and names, and under their control, shares to
that amount, during the whole time of credit given by the note, and were
ready, able and willing, at all times, to account to the plaintiff for that
number of shares, and the dividends arising thereon, whenever he en
titled himself to such an account, it is all that he could ask for under the
contract.

More recently, the supreme court of the United States, in Sexton
v. Kessler (1912) 225 U. S. 90, when discussing the rights of a
broker, said that:
.... he may satisfy the earlier customers with any stock that he has on
hand or that he buys when the time for delivery comes. . . .

At common law, apart from special contract, the pledgee has no
right to pledge the property of the pledgor. Such an agreement,
however, the courts generally imply in stockbrokerage cases in
which the shares are not fully paid for, by virtue of the general
custom of pledging in the brokerage business (Skiff v. Stoddard
(1893) 63 Conn. 198). According to the United States supreme
court in Sexton v. Kessler (1912) 225 U. S. 90:
When a broker agrees to carry stock for a customer ... he may pledge
the whole block purchased for what sum he likes. . . .

No question of the broker’s right to pledge arises when the cus
tomer makes an express contract giving him that privilege. In
brief, the broker has been given, either by custom or by express
contract, the right to hypothecate at his discretion any or all of
the securities so held by him for the purpose of providing himself
with the necessary funds to carry on the business in behalf of his
margin customers. But if he does not have in his possession a
like amount of similar securities he must not pledge for an amount
greater than the customer’s indebtedness (Douglass v. Carpenter
(1897) 17 N. Y. App. Div. 329). It was decided in Fisher v.
Mechanics and Metals National Bank, (1915) 89 N. Y. Misc. 587,
that with the consent of the customer the broker may pledge
securities deposited with him as margin for a greater amount than
the indebtedness of the customer. However, the New York
stock exchange prohibits its members from pledging or lending
more of the securities covered by a special contract than is fair
and reasonable in view of the customer’s obligations.
Where a customer’s margin stock has been pledged by a broker
the lien of the pledgee is superior to the rights of the customer.
If the broker does not pay the loan such pledgee may sell or other
wise dispose of the shares without notice to the customer and
incur no liability to him. The purchase of pledged stock by the
pledgee at a sale in the regular way conveys a good title to the
103
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particular securities as against the customer (In re Stringer (1916)
230 Fed. 177). The rights of a purchaser in these circumstances are
based upon the estoppel of the owner of the stock, since his ac
tions preclude him from disputing as against the pledgee the exis
tence of the title or the powers of the broker (Matter of Mills (1908)
125 N. Y. App. Div. 730). If a broker has rightfully pledged a
customer’s securities together with his own, the broker’s securities
must be exhausted first to pay the loan.
Although the broker is allowed to mingle the stock purchased
for and deposited by his margin customers, the laws of every
jurisdiction require him to keep in his possession or under his
control sufficient shares of a like kind to be able to make delivery
at any time to all customers without being obliged to purchase in
the market (Crehan v. Megargel (1920) 235 Mass. 279). The
court, in Gormam v. Littlefield (1913) 229 U. S. 19, said:
It was . . . the duty of the broker, if he sold the shares specifically pur
chased for the appellant, to buy others of like kind and to keep on hand
subject to the order of the customer certificates sufficient for the legitimate
demands upon him.

Justice Sheldon, in Greene v. Corey (1912) 210 Mass. 536, main
tained that:
The broker . . . must show that he has under his control, free from the
just demands of other customers and available for delivery to the customer
whose case is in question, the stocks of which that customer upon payment
will be entitled to demand delivery.

The customer contracts for the right to have the stock actually
held by the broker and does not intend to rely upon the financial
ability of the broker to purchase it when the time for delivery
arrives. If this were not the law a broker would be able to specu
late at his customer’s expense.
The margin is the amount which the customer transfers to the
broker at the beginning of the transaction and equals the differ
ence between the current price of the shares purchased and the
indebtedness. If there is no special contract between the parties,
there is an implied agreement by the customer to maintain the
proportion of margin originally deposited (Markham v. Jaudon
(1869) 41 N. Y. 235). If this amount falls below the required
level, the customer is in default, and, after demand and notice, the
broker is permitted to close out the account in order to protect
himself from loss. According to the court in Van Dusen-Harring
ton Co. v. Jungeblut (1899) 75 Minn. 298:
There is a well-established custom that if a stock touches margin, it is to
be sold for the highest it will bring.
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In Foster v. Murphy and Company (1905) 135 Fed. 47, it was
maintained that:
A margin is intended for the protection of the broker, but if he be com
pelled to postpone the sale of the property which he is carrying for the
customer until he has no margin left, it is difficult to perceive upon what
theory any adequate protection is afforded.

Even where there has been no failure on the part of the customer
to maintain his margin, the broker may, in some circumstances,
close the account. Since no time limit is usually set in a transac
tion of this kind, it would seem that the broker should not be under
obligation to keep the account open indefinitely. It has been
suggested (43 Harvard Law Review 628) that the broker may end
the relation after the lapse of a reasonable period of time for
speculation, although the customer has kept ample margin. The
extreme difficulty of defining “reasonable period of time” would
render this right of little practical utility to the broker. However,
if the broker is not under contract to carry an account for a def
inite time, and desires to close it, he may take the shares to the
customer and demand payment of the balance due on them. If
the customer refuses to pay, the broker may sell the stock on due
notice and close the account.
In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the broker must
demand more margin and give notice of the time and place of the
proposed sale before he may sell the stock of a defaulting customer.
Usually the amount required must be named, but, in White v.
Slayback (1919) 179 N. Y. Supp. 211, the court held that if the
customer knows the amount, the demand probably need not be
for a specific sum. The general rule is that demand and notice
must be served upon the customer personally. If the contract
has been made through an agent, notice to the agent is sufficient
(Small v. Housman (1913) 208 N. Y. 115). Should the customer
attempt to avoid the serving of notice, legal requirements are
satisfied by sending the papers to his place of residence (Leiter v.
Thomas (1905) 97 N.Y. Supp. 121). Where there is noattemptat
evasion, the demand and notice must actually reach the customer
or his agent—reasonable effort on the part of the broker will not
suffice.
By express contract or provision in the memorandum of pur
chase, the broker may limit his responsibility for demand and
notice to the defaulting customer before selling the margin stock
of the latter. (Godfrey v. Newman, 239 N. Y. Supp. 585 (1930).)
105

The Journal of Accountancy

If he reserves the right to sell “without demand and notice” he
may sell and close the account when the price declines enough to
deplete the margin without communicating to the customer
(Stibbard v. Owen (1928) 243 Mich. 148). Should he merely re
serve the right to sell “without notice” he must make a demand
for additional margin, but there is no obligation on his part to state
the time and place of sale (Stenton v. Jerome (1873) 54 N. Y.
480). However, before the broker can take advantage of an ex
press contract limiting his liability, he must prove it (Thompson
v. Baily (1917) 220 N. Y. 471). Mere receipt of a memorandum
is not conclusive evidence of the customer’s acquiescence to the
provisions in it (Evans v. Hubbard (1927) 221 N. Y. Supp. 642)
so the broker must produce adequate proof of the customer’s
assent before he will be permitted to avail himself of any rights
given him by such memorandum (Stibbard v. Owen (1928) 243
Mich. 148; Leviten v. Bickley (1929) 35 Fed. (2d) 825).
After demand and notice by the broker, the customer must be
allowed a reasonable length of time within which to increase his
margin and this is true although the market is in a state of panic
{Small v. Housman (1913) 208 N. Y. 115) or the exchange about
to close {Sanger v. Price (1906) 98 N. Y. Supp. 513). Neither the
death (Berberich's Estate (1917) 257 Pa. 181) nor the bankruptcy
of the customer will excuse the broker for refusing this privilege
(In re Daniels (1875) Fed. Cas. No. 3566). One hour’s notice
is not ordinarily sufficient (Lazare v. Allen (1897) 20 N. Y. App.
Div. 616); one day’s notice was held to be enough in Harris v.
Pryor (1892) 18 N. Y. Supp. 128; while the court in Stewart v.
Drake (1871) 46 N. Y. 449 decided that notice of two days would
suffice.
If the customer remains silent after demand and notice on the
part of his broker, a perplexing situation arises. Does this
silence indicate an order to sell or does it show that the customer is
willing to be carried further in the hope that the market will im
prove? Decisions covering the specific point are lacking, but in
two cases, in which the notice was defective, the courts held that
silence of the customer could not be construed as an order to sell
{Esser v. Linderman (1872) 71 Pa. 76; Lynch v. Simmons (1904)
87 N. Y. Supp. 420).
Should the broker waive the customer’s default in complying
with a demand for additional margin, he is not permitted to sell
the stock until a new demand has been made {Rogers v. Wiley
106

Margin Transactions and Law

(1892) 14 N. Y. Supp. 622). In Small v. Housman (1913) 208
N. Y. 115, it was held that a broker who, after making a demand
for margin, agreed to carry the stock until a definite future date
without further margin, waived the customer’s default and was
liable for a sale of the stock because he did not make a second
demand.
The broker, if he so desires, may increase his obligations by
special contract. He may agree to purchase and carry stocks on a
nominal margin (Keller v. Halsey (1911) 202 N. Y. 588) or he may
agree to carry stock as long as the customer wishes, regardless of
the state of his margin account and of the market, and to deliver
on demand (Hall v. Paine (1916) 224 Mass. 62). The courts
insist that the agreement be clear in order to be enforceable. A
general statement as “will see you through ” is too indefinite to be
binding {White v. Slayback (1919) 178 N. Y. Supp. 421) although
similar statements have been made the basis of an estoppel, where
the customer has not been given reasonable notice of their with
drawal {Rosenthal v. Brown (1928) 247 N. Y. 479). The customer
desiring to take advantage of such agreements must be able to
prove them.
It is difficult to determine the consideration where the agree
ment of the broker to increase his obligations is made after the
original contract has been completed. In a case in which a broker
later promised to carry the account without further margin, the
court found that the customer’s forbearance to withdraw the ac
count was the consideration {Rogers v. Wiley (1892) 131 N. Y.
527). If the customer has no intention of such action, the prob
lem of finding consideration is perplexing because the broker re
ceives no benefit. It is only just, however, that the subsequent
agreement be enforced on the ground of waiver or on the theory
that when the original contract was made a later modification was
planned by both parties.
The broker is under obligation to obey the orders of his margin
customer. If ordered to buy stock he must make the purchase.
If he accepts a margin order which could have been executed by
the exercise of reasonable care he will be responsible for his failure
to fill it {Markham v. Jaudon (1869) 41 N. Y. 235). The cus
tomer may disregard a subsequent purchase and claim damages on
the basis of the original unexecuted order and he is entitled to a
price at which the order should have been executed, subject to
any saving made by reason of a late execution. In short, if the
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broker does not buy as ordered, the customer is entitled to dam
ages measured by the difference between the price at which the
stock could have been bought had the order been executed and the
market price within a reasonable time after the customer had
notice of the failure to execute.
Where the broker fails to sell margin stock as ordered the cus
tomer may recover the profit that he would have made if the
shares had been sold according to instructions. This usually
means the difference between the amount which could have been
obtained by the broker at the time he was ordered to sell and the
amount subsequently obtained, if the latter is less than the former
(Allen v. McConihe (1891) 124 N. Y. 342).
A statement of a customer to brokers carrying stock on margin
for him, that he was leaving town and did not want to lose more
than he had to his credit at that time, was held by the court, in
Hirsch v. Jacoby (1914) 146 N. Y. Supp. 179, to be an order to
sell. The brokers, who did not sell until the loss exceeded the
margin, were not permitted to recover the difference from the
customer. Furthermore, the facts that a customer’s margin has
become exhausted and he has refused to furnish more do not
justify a broker in refusing to sell, on his customer’s orders, and he
is liable for the damages resulting from such failure to obey (Zim
merman v. Heil (1895) 86 Hun. 114). However, a failure to re
ceive an order is a good excuse for not executing it. The burden
is on the customer to prove that his instructions actually reached
the broker (Birnbaum v. May (1902) 58 N. Y. App. Div. 76).
The broker must procure delivery of the margin shares to the
customer on demand and tender of the amount due on the transac
tion (Chase v. Boston (1902) 180 Mass. 458). If the parties do
not intend that delivery shall be made, the contract is illegal
(Rice v. Winslow (1902) 180 Mass. 500) because it is a mere wager
on the market price of the stock.
Where the broker makes an unauthorized purchase to close out
a short sale previously made, the courts have uniformly held that
the customer may repudiate and then completely disregard (Bar
ber v. Ellingwood, No. 1. (1909) 120 N. Y. Supp. 947). He may,
at any time after prompt repudiation, require the broker to buy in
the short stock, and may sue for the difference between the price
at which the stock could have been bought upon such order and
the price at which the unauthorized purchase was made (White v.
Smith (1874) 54 N. Y. 522). No question of reasonable time is
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involved if the repudiation of the wrongful purchase has been
prompt.
An unauthorized sale of a customer’s margin stock by a broker
is conversion, where made without notice of time and place of sale
(Baker v. Drake (1876) 66 N. Y. 518) unless notice is waived
(Milliken v. Dehon (1863) 27 N. Y. 364) or waiver is implied from
proof of reasonable usage known to both parties (Skiff v. Stoddard
(1893) 63 Conn. 198; Van Duzen-Harrington Co. v. Jungeblut
(1899) 75 Minn. 298). Upon discovery of the wrongful sale, the
customer may disaffirm it and call upon the broker to replace or he
may replace himself and sue the broker for any damage that he
may suffer.
The early rule in New York was that a plaintiff in an action for
conversion might recover as damages the greatest value reached
by the stock converted from the time of conversion down to the
time of the trial, provided that the action had been brought within
a reasonable length of time and had been diligently prosecuted
(Markham v. Jaudon (1869) 41 N. Y. 235). The underlying
theory seems to have been that the wrongful sale might be disre
garded and the plaintiff given the benefit of the highest price he
might have obtained up to the time of the trial (Romaine v.
Allen (1863) 26 N. Y. 309). It soon became evident that this
rule was not equitable in the case of speculative transactions in
volving corporate shares (Mathews v. Coe (1872) 49 N. Y. 57)
because it presupposed the willingness and ability of the customer
to carry the stock through all fluctuations and to pick the highest
price. This usually gave him more than he would have received
for the stock had there been no conversion and placed a broker
who had acted in good faith, but erroneously, at a disadvantage.
The rule, however, was followed in New York until 1873, when
Justice Rapallo, in Baker v. Drake (1873) 53 N. Y. 211, said:
An amount sufficient to indemnify the party injured for the loss, which is
the natural, reasonable and proximate result of the wrongful act complained of, and which a proper degree of prudence on the part of the com
plainant would not have adverted, is the measure of damages. . . . The
advance in the market price of the stock from the time of the sale up to a
reasonable time to replace it, after the plaintiff received notice of the sale,
would afford a complete indemnity.

The doctrine of Baker v. Drake is also followed by the United
States supreme court and by the highest courts of Connecticut,
Illinois, New Jersey and Virginia.
In Pennsylvania, the measure of damages for an unauthorized
sale is the highest market price of the stock at any time between
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the conversion and the verdict, with interest (Sproul v. Sloan
(1913) 241 Pa. St. 284). The highest market price at any time
between the conversion and the commencement of the action is
the measure of damages allowed by the courts of California.
{Woltz v. Hutton, 204 Pac. 248).
The customer whose margin shares have been converted is
given a reasonable length of time in which to decide what to do,
and to seek advice and funds if he should desire them. This
period of time generally begins to run only after he learns of the
wrongful sale. However, if he has knowledge of facts sufficient
to put him on inquiry that would have revealed the conversion,
the reasonable period starts when this knowledge was obtained
{Mayer v. Monzo (1917) 221 N. Y. 442). In one case the court
held that a customer was put on inquiry when he learned that his
broker had gone out of business {O'Connor v. Gilmore (1919)
N. Y. App. Div. 3rd Dept. N. Y. L. J. 1439).
Where a broker has wrongfully closed a customer’s margin ac
count, and, after learning what has happened, the customer re
mains silent, such silence is considered to be a ratification of the
broker’s action. In a recent case (Leviten v. Bickley (1929) 35
Fed. (2d) 825) in which a broker, without the permission of his
customer, had closed the account of the latter, it was held that the
acceptance of the balance and a silence of nine weeks was tanta
mount to ratification and barred recovery in action against the
broker. However, if the customer is not aware of all the facts, the
courts will not construe his silence as ratification {Burnham v.
Lawson (1907) 103 N. Y. Supp. 482). The purpose of the rule,
that silence in these circumstances is ratification, is to prevent the
customer, by his delay, from taking advantage of a fluctuating
market at the expense of his broker (Leviten v. Bickley (1929) 35
Fed. (2d) 825).
A broker who fails to keep control of enough stock to satisfy
the demands of his margin customers is also guilty of conversion.
According to the court in Whitlock v. Seaboard National Bank
(1899) 29 N. Y. Misc. 84:
. . . the broker is guilty of conversion if he cannot return the stock origi
nally pledged or similar certificates, upon payment by the original debtor of
the amount owing on his stock transaction.

Losses resulting from the broker’s failure to maintain the
amount of any particular kind of stock should be apportioned
among the margin customers entitled to that kind of stock. This
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is the same as saying that the shares in control of the broker
should be divided among the margin customers claiming the par
ticular kinds. Suppose that a broker, who holds on margin six
hundred shares of stock A for Doe and four hundred shares of the
same stock for Roe, is able to produce only five hundred shares of
this stock. Since the law is that customers claiming the stock
must share it pro rata, Doe is entitled to three-fifths of the total, or
three hundred shares, while Roe will receive two-fifths, or two
hundred shares. The courts have decided it to be unjust to ap
portion a loss resulting from a shortage of one kind of stock among
all the margin customers of a broker because there is no common
interest in the particular kinds of stock held. However, where
the broker pledges stock held on margin for more than the amount
owed on such stock by customers, the resulting loss must be
borne by all the margin customers in proportion to their respec
tive claims (In re McIntire (1910) 181 Fed. 955).
When a stockbroker becomes bankrupt there is no controversy
if he controls enough shares to meet the demands of all margin
customers. If the available stock is inadequate for this purpose,
there usually appear two distinct conflicts: one, between margin
customers and general creditors and the other among the margin
customers themselves. The general creditors insist that the mar
gin customers hold the same claims on property of the bankrupt as
they themselves have, that is, they are merely creditors with no
property rights, and the indebtedness such customers may prove
is the amount of their credit balances on the date of the bank
ruptcy. The margin customers answer by maintaining that they
have employed the broker as their common agent to buy and sell
stocks, and, that in executing their commissions he obtained
stocks which he holds for them; therefore, these stocks may not
be counted as part of the general assets. Moreover, the margin
customers may have considerable trouble in settling their own
differences. One writer says:
. . . they seek all sorts of priorities and superior equities as against one
another and to that end grasp at every device and circumstance to identify
and to follow particular securities as belonging to themselves.

The Massachusetts law favors the general creditors in that it
recognizes the contractual claims of margin customers to the ex
clusion of all property rights, except, possibly, in the case of
securities deposited as margin. The general creditors are sup
ported in their claim that the customers are merely creditors like
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themselves with provable claims. The federal courts in bank
ruptcy cases controlled by the Massachusetts statutes have con
formed with the apparent doctrine in that jurisdiction (In re
Swift (1900) 105 Fed. 493; In re Gay & Sturgis (1918) 251 Fed.
420) which is in keeping with their policy of following the local
law (In re Codman (1923) 287 Fed. 806). However, since in the
other important jurisdictions the customers have the legal title to
the margin stock, the courts in these states have held that they
have property rights in it in addition to their contractual rights
arising from the agency relationship, so the margin shares are kept
apart from the general assets of the bankrupt broker (In re Solo
mon (1920) 268 Fed. 108).
If there is a deficiency of particular shares, the margin cus
tomers have no rights against the general assets to force the
trustee to purchase stock to make up the shortage. Although
the broker was at all times bound to do this, the obligation does
not pass to the trustee because its proper discharge requires the
skill and judgment which the bankrupt himself was employed to
exercise. The customer usually has a choice in these circum
stances. He may rely upon his property rights and, in that case,
he and other claimants to similar stock will share it pro rata
{Duel v. Hollins (1916) 241 U. S. 523); or he may waive his prop
erty rights and prove his claim as a general creditor. If some of
the margin customers, who have property rights in the shares of
a certain security, do not assert these rights, the weight of au
thority is that the proportionate interests of the other customers
in the shares are not increased, but that the shares of those who
may claim, but fail to do so, go to the general creditors {In re
Archer (1923) 289 Fed. 267).
If the bankrupt broker is guilty of excessive pledging of margin
shares, the trustee should pay the excess out of the general assets
to the extent necessary to redeem the stocks in which customers
seek to enforce their property rights. Since the trustee takes the
property subject to all valid claims, this is merely the performance
of a fiduciary obligation and is not a preference {Richardson v.
Shaw (1908) 209 U. S. 365). He must not permit the pledged
stocks to be taken to pay the debts of the bankrupt broker. He is
under obligation to deliver upon demand and tender of payment,
and it would be impossible for him to fulfill that obligation if he
did not redeem the pledged stock. However, the trustee, any
more than the bankrupt, is not required to procure the release of
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stocks pledged for more than the amount which the customer
owes on them, if the customer does not pay or tender the amount
of his debt.
Where the broker has failed to purchase the stock for which a
customer has put up a margin, but has the money, ear-marked, in
his possession on the date of bankruptcy, the customer and not the
trustee is entitled to it (In re Wettengel (1916) 238 Fed. 798). If
the broker mingles the customer’s margin with his own funds, the
law presumes that any money withdrawn belongs to the broker
while the remaining funds are the property of the customer (In
re Mulligan (1902) 116 Fed. 715).
The courts indicate by their decisions that they appreciate the
advantageous position of the stockbroker in margin transactions.
The evident trend is to give the customer as much protection as
possible without encroaching upon the rights of the broker or
hindering him in the performance of what is an important eco
nomic service. The signs of the time point to more numerous,
larger, and more widely distributed stock issues, and the attitude
of our jurists is favorable to such corporate expansion.
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